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Curley: Health Care Unit Determinations: The Board Ignores the Mandate of

HEALTH CARE UNIT DETERMINATIONS:
THE BOARD IGNORES THE MANDATE OF
CONGRESS AND THE COURTS OF APPEALS
Michael A. Curley*
INTRODUCTION

In 1974, Congress amended the Labor Management Relations Act
(the "Act')' so as to extend coverage to non-profit health care institutions.2 This change, made through deletion of exclusionary language in
the Act which had been added in the 1947 Amendments, 3 was brought
about by Congress' belief that no justifiable reason existed for excluding
4
employees in this expansive industry.
In choosing to extend the Act to non-profit health care institutions,
Congress recognized that the delicate nature of health care operations
would necessitate the consideration of factors not relevant in other settings,5 There has been considerable controversy concerning the extent to
which the traditional approaches of the National Labor Relations Board
(the "Board') to resolving management/labor problems should be altered
in health care settings. Two areas where this debate has been especially
interesting are: (1) solicitation rights of health care employees; 6 and (2)
"appropriate unit" determinations in health-care facilities, the subject of
this article.
* B.S., Drexel University, 1980; J.D., Villanova University Law School, 1983; Associate, O'Melveny

& Myers, Los Angeles, California; Member California Bar.
1. Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 29 U.S.C. §§151-169 (1976).
2. 29 U.S.C. §152(14) defines "health-care institution" as "... any hospital, convalescent hospital, health maintenance organization, health clinic, nursing home, extended care facility, or other
institution devoted to the care of sick, infirm or aged persons." Id. For further discussion of the 1974
amendments to the Act, see Vernon, Labor Relations in the Health Care Field under the 1974
Amendments to the NationalLabor Relations Act: An Overview andAnalysis, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 202
(1975).
3. 29 U.S.C. §152. Coverage was afforded by striking the following from the definition of
employer in §152(2): "any corporation or association operating a hospital, if no part of the net
earnings inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual." Id
4. S. REP. No. 93-766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1974), reprintedin 1974 U.S. CODE CONG.& AD.
NEws 3946, 3948. See also infra note 30 and accompanying text.
5. S. REP. No. 93-766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1974), reprintedin 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 3946, 3948. See also infra note 30-35 and accompanying text.
6. See NLRB v. Baptist Hosp. Inc., 442 U.S. 773 (1979); Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S.
493 (1978). See also Comment, Employee Solicitation Rights In the Health-Care Industry - A
ProposalFor Change,28 VILL. L. REv. 622 (1983).
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After examining briefly the Board's traditional standards for unit
determination, 7 this article will analyze the 1974 Amendments as they
apply to unit determinations. 8 Next, it will examine the post-amendment
decisions of the Board and the various courts of appeals in this area of
law, 9 culminating in an analysis of the Board's recent St. FrancisHospi-

tal'0 decision. Finally, it will examine reasons for the widening gap
between the Board and the courts of appeals" as well as suggest the
12
author's views on how this conflict ultimately should be resolved.
HISTORY

The Board's TraditionalStandardsfor
DeterminingAppropriate Units
Section 9(b) of the Act 3 empowers the Board to determine the
appropriate bargaining unit in each case'.14 The Board is given broad
discretion, limited only by its obligation "to assure employees fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by [the Act]." 5 In maintaining its
dual function of ensuring employees their guaranteed right to organize
and bargain collectively and at the same time fostering industrial stability,' 6 the Board is not required to find the most appropriate unit; rather,
7. See infra notes 13-28 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 29-37 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 38-110 and accompanying text.
10. See 265 N.L.R.B. No. 120, 112 L.R.R.M. 1153 (1982). See also infra notes 111-46 and
accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 147-65 and accompanying text.
12. Ia.
13. 29 U.S.C. §159(b) (1976).
14. Id. Section 159(b) states: "The Board shall decide in each case whether in order to assure to
employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by the subchapter, the unit appropriate for the purpose of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or
subdivision thereof. . . ." Id Technically, what is commony called the appropriate "bargaining unit"
is really the appropriate "election unit" since groups of properly elected units may choose to form a
single largei group for bargaining purposes. See R. GORMAN, BASicTEXT ON LABOR LAW 66 (1976).
15. 29 U.S.C. §159(b). See NLRB v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 341 F.2d 750, 756, cert. denied,
382 U.S. 830 (1965) (court of appeals held that appropriate unit determination is question of fact for
Board to decide in each case and that Board decision will not be overturned except for abuse of
discretion or violation of statute).
16. Kalamazoo Paper Box Corp., 136 N.L.R.B. 134, 49 L.R.R.M. 1715 (1950). Kalamazoo involved a small company which shipped paper boxes in intra-state as well as interstate
commerce. Id. at 135, 49 L.R.R.M. at 1715-16. Two truck drivers sought separate representation
from the other four service department employees. Id. at 134-35, 49 L.R.R.M. at 1715. After
conducting a thorough'analysis of both the facts and the policies involved, the Board determined that
the truck drivers did not "have such special and distinct interests as would outweigh and override the
community of interest shared with other plant employees." Id. at 139, 49 L.R.R.M. at 1718.
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an appropriate unit.17 Even with this broad grant of discretion to the
Board there have been instances where courts of appeals have refused to
8
enforce Board unit determinations.
As was noted earlier, the Act gives little guidance to the Board in the
way of criteria to be used in determining appropriate units under Section
9(b). 19 The Board, in fulfilling its function of assuring employees the
fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by the Act, 20 must
avoid finding appropriate a unit which is too narrow, for such a unit
would curtail the bargaining power of the union representing that unit
and may generate "in-fighting" among the employees in the plant. 2' Conversely, a unit that is too broad will, among other things, frustrate effective communication as well as hamper effective negotiation and administration of the labor contract.22 It is generally agreed by both union
organizers and management representatives that the smaller the unit and
the more homogeneous, the easier it is for the union to organize and
prevail in an election. Thus, it is a prevalent management strategy to use
the representation hearing to expand the size of the unit and to increase
the heterogeneity of its composition.
The Board's traditional test, which strikes what is believed to be the
appropriate balance in unit determination cases, is the so-called "community of interests" test.23 The factors which the Board will look to in
determining "community of interests" include: (1) similarity in scale and
manner of determining earnings; (2) similarity in benefits, working conditions and hours; (3) similarity in the type of work; (4) similarity in qualifications, skills and training; (5) frequency of contact with other employees;
17. NLRB v. Pinkerton's Nat'l Detective Agency, Inc., 202 F.2d 230 (9th Cir. 1953). See also
NLRB v. Morand Bros. Beverage Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 409, 26 L.R.R.M. 1501 (1950), enforced, 190
F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1951).
18. Id. See, e.g., NLRB v. West Suburban Hosp., 570 F.2d 213 (7th Cir. 1978). It should be
noted at this point that unit determinations made by the Board are not directly subject to judicial
review. The usual route for judicial adjudication of Board unit determination is for the employer to
refuse to bargain with the representative of the unit which it feels was incorrectly granted separate
representation. Upon an 8(a)(5) charge filed by the union, the General Counsel will issue an unfair
labor practice complaint and move to transfer the case to the Board and then move for summary
judgment. The Board does not permit in the unfair labor practice proceeding any relitigation of the
issues decided in the representation proceeding. The Board will grant the motion and then, upon its
petition to enforce or the employer's petition to review the court of appeals can then determine the
propriety of the Board's action in finding the unit appropriate. See, e.g., NLRB v. Vest Suburban
Hosp., 570 F.2d 213 (7th Cir. 1978).
19. See 29 U.S.C. §159(b). See also supra note 14 and accompanying text.
20. Id.
21. For further discussion of the problems facing the Board in unit determinations, see R.
GORMAN, supra note 14, at 68-69.
22. Id at 68.
23. For further discussion of the traditional "community of interests" test, see A. Cox, D. BOK
& R GORMAN, CASEs AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW at 300 (8th ed. 1977). The term "community
of interests" has become a term of art in the issue of unit determination, and has been so developed in
the case law. Id
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(6) geographic proximity; (7) continuity of production processes; (8)
common supervision; (9) collective bargaining history; (10) desires of the
employees affected; and (11) extent of union organization. 24
Application of the Board's "community of interests" test is well illustrated in American Cyanamid Company.2 5 There, the issue was whether
maintenance employees enjoyed a sufficient community of interests that
they might be deemed an appropriate bargaining unit apart from production employees. 26 The Board found that: (1) the employer had failed in his
attempt to prove that the maintenance employees were not separately
identifiable from production workers due to employer's integrated operation; (2) the maintenance employees were established in separate departmental sections and had their own supervision; and (3) the maintenance
employees performed work requiring particular skills not required of the
plant's production workers. 27 The Board held that based upon this evidence the maintenance workers enjoyed a "community of interests" entiling them to separate representation under the Act. 28
The 1974 CongressionalAdmonition
As previously noted, Congress extended the coverage of the Act to a
majority of the nation's health care employees in 1974 by amending the
Act's definition of "employer." 29 Since the Taft-Hartley Act, the term
"employer" had excluded non-profit hospitals; the 1974 Amendments
deleted this exclusion. Prompting this change was the congressional conclusion that there was no acceptable reason why the large number of
employees in non-profit, non-public hospitals should continue to be
30
excluded from the coverage of the Act.
Congress recognized, however, that due to the peculiar nature of
health care operations as compared to industrial settings, work stoppages
in health carb facilities could lead to far more serious consequences. 31
Sensitivity to this danger led to the incorporation of special notice provisions in the 1974 Amendments regarding strikes and other work
stoppages. 32
24. See id. at 275. Section 9(c)(5) of the Act prohibits the Board from relying solely upon the
extent of organization in determining the appropriate unit.
25. 131 N.L.R.B. 909,48 L.R.R.M. 1152 (1961).
26. Id. at 910, 48 L.R.R.M. 1152.
27. Id.
28. Ia
29. See 29 U.S.C. §152(2). See also supra notes 1, 2 and accompanying text.
30. See S. REP.No. 93-766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, (1974), reprintedin 1974 U. S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 3946, 3948.
31. Id. at 3948-52. The peculiar circumstances involved in a health-care work stoppage stem
from the foreseeable consequences of such a stoppage in a hospital setting as compared with an
industrial setting including the possible interruption of critically necessary health-care treatment to
patients. Id
32. See Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 496-97 n.12 (1978).
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Section I(d) of the 1974 Act amended the notice provisions of Section 8(d) of the Act by requiring (1) ninety-day notice of termination or
expiration of a contract in the health-care industry, as opposed to sixtyday notice in other industries; (2) sixty-day notice of contract termination
or expiration to the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS);
(3) a thirty-day notice to FMCS regarding initial contract disputes arising
after recognition and, (4) requiring health care institutions and labor
33
organizations to participate in mediation at the direction of FMCS.
Section 1(e) of the 1974 Act added Section 8(g) to the Act which provides
for a mandatory ten-day written notice from labor organizations to health
care institutions prior to engaging in picketing, strikes or other concerted
refusals to work. 34
A related provision offered by Senator Taft and based upon the
same considerations would have limited the number of allowable appropriate health care bargaining units to four: (1) professional employees; (2)
technical employees; (3) clerical employees; and (4) maintenance and
service employees. 35 Congress chose not to limit the Board's discretion in
unit determination in this manner.36 However, Congress' concern for the
underlying problem manifested itself in the following all-important
admonition which was included in both the House and Senate Repor-ts
accompanying the final version of the bill:
Due consideration should be given by the Board to prevent proliferation of bargaining units in the health care industry. In this connection, the Committee notes with approval the recent Board decisions in FourSeasoits Nursing Center,208 NLRB No. 50,85 LRRM
1093 (1974), and Woodland Park Hospital,205 NLRB No. 144, 84
LRRM 1075 (1973), -as well as the trend toward broader units enunciated in Extendicae of West Virginia, 203 NLRB No. 170, 83
LRRM 1242 (1973).37
During the floor discussion of the bill, Senator Taft emphasized the
need to prevent a proliferation of bargaining units in the health care field
and stated that the need to avoid such proliferation was a central point
which led to agreement on the 1974 Amendments. 38 The legislative history thus clearly shows that Congress, in allowing the Board discretion in
determining appropriate bargaining units in the health care field, "expected

33.
34.
35.
36.

National Labor Relations Act §8(d), 29 U.S.C. §158(d)(1976).
National Labor Relations Act §8(g), 29 U.S.C. §158(g)(1976).
See S. 2292, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973).
29 U.S.C. §152(2). See also supra note 32 and accompanying text.

37. S. REP. No. 93-766, supranote 30 at 3950. The tiniform legislative history is unique in the
Amendments to the Act and represents a carefully negotiated compromise by union and management

representatives.
3.

See 120 CONG. REc. 12944-45 (1974).
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the Board... to give substantial weight to the public interest in preventing
39
unit fragmentation."
Unit DeterminationDecisions of the Board and
the Courts of Appeals: Sharply Different Views On Interpretation
of the CongressionalAdmonition
Shortly after the 1974 Amendments, the Board decided Shriner's
Hospital,40 wherein five stationary engineers employed by the San
Francisco-based hospital for crippled children sought separate representation.4 1 A total of eighty-eight employees worked at the hospital.42 The
engineers involved were responsible for twenty-four-hour-a-day operation
and maintenance of the boilers. 43 On occasion they were asked to perform
other maintenance tasks as well as some security duties. 44 No special
training was required prior to employment as a stationary engineer.45
Based on these facts, the Board held that the five stationary engineers did not possess a sufficiently separate and distinct "community of
interests" to warrant a separate unit.46 The Board relied upon the congressional admonition in the 1974 Amendments, stating that Congress, in
adopting the health care amendments, recognized the uniqueness of the
health care industry in terms of serving the sick, the infirm and the aged,
and thus the need for special consideration. 47 The Board also relied upon
the peculiar nature of the health care industry and, after weighing all of
the traditional unit determination criteria, concluded that the high degree
of integration of operations performed in health care facilities, when
combined with the congressional admonition, counseled against the allowance of several separate units, determining that to hold otherwise would
48
totally frustrate the congressional intent.
In the decisions following Shriner's Hospital, the Board's reliance
upon the congressional admonition lessened and it began to apply its
traditional "community of interests" approach. The Board decided Mercy
Hospitals of Sacramento49 in 1975. There, the Board allowed a separate
39. See NLRB v. Mercy Hosp. Ass'n, 606 F.2d 22,25-26 (2d Cir. 1979). For a further analysis
demonstrating the rational connection between broader appropriate units and fewer work stoppages,
see R. GORMAN, supranote 14, at 66-69.
40. 217 N.L.R.B. 806, 89 L.R.R.M. 1076 (1975).
41. Id. at 807, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1078.
42. Id
43. Id
44. Id. The security tasks which were required of the maintenance employees followed no set
schedule and took up only a small proportional amount of the worktime of the employees in
question.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 808,89 L.R.R.M. at 1079.
48. Id at 807-08, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1079-80.
49. 217 N.L.R.B. 765, 89 L.R.R.M. 1097 (1975).
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unit of registered nurses (RNs), contending that the twenty-four-hour-aday responsibilities of RNs, uniform national licensing for RNs and a
history of exclusive representation entitled RNs to a unit separate from
other professionals.5 0 The Board's per se policy of separate representation
for RNs was rejected by the Ninth Circuit in St. Francis Hospital of
Lynwood. 51 The court called for application of a "disparity of interests"
approach in lieu of the traditional "community of interests" approach
which the Board continued to apply in health care institutions, despite the
congressional admonition against unit proliferation.
In response to the Ninth Circuit's decision in St. FrancisHospitalof
Lynwood, the Board, in Newtown- Wellesley Hospital,52 retreated from its
per se position that RNs were entitled to a separate unit.53 However,
despite the Ninth Circuit's view of the statutory interpretation of the 1974
Amendments to the Act, the Board continued to apply the traditional
"community of interests" test on the health care unit question.54 After
Newton- Wellesley, the Board, in Brookwood Hospital,5 5 found that a
separate unit of RNs was appropriate even though the RNs were involved
in a "team" concept of patient care and worked closely with other
6
professionals.5
In 1976, the Board decided St. Vincent's Hospital,57 wherein a group
of four boiler operators employed by the non-profit New Jersey corporation operating a health care facility sought separate representation from
other maintenance employees.5 8 Noting that the boiler operators spent
approximately ninety percent of their working time in the basement boiler
room segregated from co-workers, were specially licensed by the state,
and had different shifts from other maintenance employees, 59 the Board
applied its traditional standards which recognized that licensed boiler
room employees could constitute a separate unit.60 An election was
ordered with the boiler room employees constituting an appropriate
unit.6t Nowhere in the brief majority opinion is there any mention of the
50. Id at 767, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1099-1101.
51. 601 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1979).
52. 250 N.L.R.B. 409, 104 L.R.R.M. 1384 (1980).
53. Id. at 411, 104 L.R.R.M. at 1386.
54. Id. at 412, 104 L.R.R.M. at 1387.
55. 252 N.L.R.B. 748, 105 L.R.R.M. 1331 (1980).
56. Id. at 748-49, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1331-32.
57. 223 N.L.R.B. 638, 91 L.R.R.M. 1513 (1976).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. In a separate concurring opinion, Member Penello attempted to distinguish Shriner's
Hosp. from St. Vincent's Hosp., relying upon the findings that the employees involved in Shriner's
Hosp. were ofterr asked to perform tasks in other areas of the hospital, that the night shift engineers
were often asked to move patients in Shriner'sHosp. and that the engineers in Shriner's Hosp. were
not required to be specially licensed. Id. at 639-40, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1513-14 (Member Penello,
concurring).
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congressional admonition concerning unit proliferation in the health care
62
field.
Upon the hospital's petition for review, the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit denied enforcement of the Board's order.63 The court recognized the broad discretion granted the Board in determining appropriate units-but found that the Board's failure to heed the congressional
admonition against unit proliferation in the health care field was in violation of its duty. 64 The court noted that the Board majority failed to eveni
address the admonition 65 and found this fact determinative, stating that in
view of the considerable attention devoted to the problem of unit proliferation in the health care field during the congressional debate on the
amendments, it was obvious that Congress attached much importance to
the unit proliferation problem. 66 The court further stated that the legislative history of the 1974 Amendments clearly called for the Board to apply
a standard in health care unit determination cases which is different from
its traditional unit determination approach. 67 Absent from the court of
appeals' decision in St. Vincent's is the strong language present in later
courts of appeals decisions rebuking the Board's use of the traditional
"community of interests" analysis. 68 The reason is that the court, unaware
that the Board was resisting any change from the application of traditional unit determination standards, did not foresee the Board's refusal to
follow its suggested approach.69
In NLRB v. West Suburban Hospital,70 the conflicting interpretations of the congressional admonition by the Board and the judiciary
became apparent. 71 In the proceedings before the Board, a group of
twenty-one maintenance employees sought separate representation from
the other 360 non-professional employees at an Illinois non-profit hospital. 72 The Board relied upon its findings that the maintenance employees
spent a great deal of their time in a particular area of the hospital segregated from other non-professional employees and that they interacted
62. See id. The congressional admonition was addressed in the separate concurring opinion of
Member Penello. Id. at 639. However, he felt that under the facts of the case, separate representational status was appropriate despite the admonition. Id. at 639-40.
63. St. Vincent's Hosp. v. NLRB, 567 F.2d 588 (3d Cir. 1977).
64. Id. at 592-93. The court stated that section 9(b) of the Act authorizes the Board to
determine appropriate units and "contains few restrictions on the Board's discretion and courts rarely
disturb its determinations ... unless they exceed the Board's power." Id. (citing Packard Motor Car
Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485 (1947)).
65. Id. at 590-93.
66. Id at 591.
67. Id. at 592.
68. See infra notes 73-110 and accompanying text.
69. Id
70. 570 F.2d 213, 216 (7th Cir. 1978).
71. I at 216.
72. West Suburban Hosp., 224 N.L.R.B. 1349,92 L.R.R.M. 1369 (1976).
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with each other approximately fifty percent of their working time, and
found that the twenty-one maintenance employees constituted a separate
appropriate unit.73 The Board majority did mention once the congressional admonition against undue proliferation in the health-care field, 74
but only briefly, thus demonstrating that it did not view it as a major
factor. 75 The dissent at the Board level did not focus upon the admonition
against unit proliferation either, but rather upon traditional factors, in
finding that a "community of interests" sufficient to warrant separate
76
representation did not exist.
The Seventh Circuit denied enforcement of the Board's order which
required the hospital to bargain with the newly certified bargaining unit
consisting of the twenty-one maintenance employees. 77 The court began
its analysis by stating that the Board's appropriate unit determination
would be reviewed against the backdrop of the legislative history of the
1974 Amendments to the Act. 78 After reviewing the history of the
Amendments, 79 the court focused upon earlier courts of appeals decisions
determining that the Board's traditional approach in unit determination
cases was improper in health care cases due to that legislative history.80
Finding that the Board had paid mere lip-service to the congressional
admonition against unit proliferation in health care facilities, the court
concluded by finding that the Board was not giving it the "due consideration" mandated by the legislative history of the Amendments. 81 The court
of appeals decision in West Suburban Hospitalevinces a belief that the
Board failed to heed a congressional mandate, but does not contain the
strong chastisements characteristic of later courts of appeals decisions on
82
this issue.
Two 1979 decisions, NLRB v. Mercy Hospital Association83 and
Allegheny GeneralHospitalv. NLRB,84 demonstrate the increasing concem of the courts of appeals regarding the Board's failure to follow an
acceptable approach in health care unit determination cases. 85 In Mercy
73. Id at 1351, 92 L.1R.M. at 1370-71.
74. Id
75. Id.
76. Id at 1351-52,92 L.R.R.M. at 1371-72.
77. 570 F.2d at 216.
78. Id. at 214 (citing Memorial Hosp. of Roxborough v. NLRB, 545 F.2d 351 (3d Cir. 1976);
St. Vinent's Hosp. v. NLRB, 567 F.2d.588 (3d Cir. 1977)).
79. See supra notes 29-37 and accompanying text.
80. 570 F.2d at 215-16.
81. Id. at 216.
82. See supranotes 73-110 and accompanying text.
83. 606 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,445 U.S. 971 (1980).
84. 608 F.2d 965 (3d Cir. 1979).
85. See supra notes 73-110 and accompanying text. By this time, a variety of the circuits had
expressed dissatisfaction with the Board's approach to determining appropriate units in the health
care field. See Husband, Determining Appropriate Units in Health Care Institutions - The Gap
Widens, 32 LAB. L. 780 (1981).
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Hospital, a group of twenty-three maintenance employees sought separate representation. 86 The facility was a non-profit hospital with 1,287
employees working in thirty-two departments. 87 The Board had applied
its traditional -"community of interests" standard and found the unit
88
sought by the maintenance employees to be an appropriate unit.
As was by then becoming a pattern, the court of appeals denied
enforcement due to the Board's failure to give sufficient weight to the
congressional admonition against unit proliferation in health care facilities.8 9 The court noted that the Board had begun to view the admonition
as merely a warning to avoid the extensive proliferation of units allowed
in the construction industry, but not necessarily as advice to avoid the
extent of proliferation found in other areas. 90 The court rejected this
approach and interpreted the admonition as calling for a standard more
protective not only than that applied in the construction industry, but
than that applied in other industries as well. 91
In Allegheny GeneralHospital,the appellate court's attitude toward
the Board's approach to health-care unit determinations is expressed in
the opinion's initial paragraphs:
This petition for review of an order of the [Board] requires us to
review the actions of an agency which declines to follow our precedent
while conceding the applicability of that precedent. We hold that the
NLRB must respect the applicable decisions of this court, and therefore we grant the [Hospital's] petition for review and deny the Board's
cross petition for enforcement. 92
The Board, using its traditional "community of interests" test, 93 had
held that the maintenance employees were entitled to separate representation from other service employees. 94 The Board argued before the court of
appeals: (1) that the court must uphold any Board order which is "reasonably defensible;" 95 (2) that the courts of appeals had wrongly decided
St. Vincent's and Memorial Hospital;96 and (3) that it had heeded the
congressional admonition against health care unit proliferation in deciding the case.97 All three arguments were rejected by the court.98
86. Mercy Hosp. Ass'n, 238 N.L.R.B. 1018, 99 L.R.R.M. 1579 (1978).

87. Id
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id
606 F.2d at 28.
Id at 27 (citing Allegheney Gen. Hosp., 239 N.L.R.B. 872, 100 L.R.R.M. 1030 (1978).
Id.at 27-28.
708 F.2d at 966.
Allegheny Gen. Hosp., 239 N.L.R.B. 872, 100 L.R.R.M. 1030 (1978).
Id at 873, 100 LR.R.M. at 1031.

95. 608 F.2d at 967.
96.

Id See also supranotes 47-59 and accompanying text.

97. 608 F.2d at 967.
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The court concluded that while agencies charged with administering
federal law in specific areas are entitled to deference, the final determination concerning interpretations of congressional mandates rests with the
courts. 99 In response to the Board's disagreement with the courts of
appeals' decisions in St. Vincent's and Memorial Hospital, the court
noted that the Board was not seeking to follow precedent by distinguishing a case factually from those cases binding as precedent. 00 Rather, the
court noted, this was "a most unusual circumstance in which a federal
agency has refused to apply the law announced by the federal judiciary." 10 1 The court refused to reconsider the recent decisions challenged
by the Board, based upon a failure by the Board to show subsequent
events calling for such reconsideration 02 as well as upon subsequent
reliance on the decisions by sister circuits. 03 The court stressed the doctrine of stare decisis and asserted the power of the federal judiciary to
interpret statutes enacted by Congress. 04
Finally, in responding to the Board's contention that it had given due
consideration to unit proliferation as required by judicial interpretation of
the 1974 Amendments, the court noted that the Board had expressly
relied upon American Cyanamid,l0 5 which did not in any way consider
the special concerns regarding unit proliferation present in health care
106
facilities.
In 1980, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit decided Mary
Thompson Hospital,Inc. v. NLRB.10 7 The court's anger and frustration
with what was seen as an intentional refusal to heed an obligatory duty by
the Board was openly expressed in the case.108 The Board had applied its
traditional "community of interests" tests and found that four stationary
engineers were entitled to separate representation. 09 The Board majority
failed to even mention the congressional admonition against unit proliferation in health care facilities.' 10 This, along with the Board's open disregard of what the court believed to be clear precedent in the area, promp-

98. Id.
99. Id. at 968.
100. Id.
101. Id
102. Id at 969.
103. Id. (citing NLRB v. Mercy Hosp. Ass'n, 606 F.2d 22,26-28 (2d Cir. 1979), NLRB v. West
Suburban Hosp., 570 F.2d 213, 216 (7th Cir. 1979)).
104. 608 F.2d at 970.
105. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
106. 608 F.2d at 970-71.
107. 621 F.2d 858 (7th Cir. 1980).
108. Id at 864.
109. See Mary Thompson Hosp., 241 N.L.R.B. 766, 100 L.R.R.M. 1572 (1979).
110. Id

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1984

11

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [1984], Art. 4
Hofstra Labor Law Journal

[Vol. 2:1

ted the court to state that "such flagrant disregard of judicial precedent
must not continue."'
The court began its analysis by noting that in Shriner's Hospital the
Board had properly considered the congressional admonition concerning
unit proliferation.1 2 The court then noted that in cases following Shriner's Hospital, the Board had not faithfully followed that congressional
directive and had returned to its traditional "community of interests" test
in health care cases.' 13 The court next proceeded to analyze several courts
of appeals cases which expressly called for an approach different from the
Board's traditional method of deciding such cases.1 4 Only after proceeding through this thorough analysis did the court chastise the Board for
violating its duty." 5
Chief Justice Fairchild filed a brief dissenting opinion." 6 It stressed
the fact that the admonition was not incorporated in the amendments as
enacted," 7 nor was it necessary in the interpretation of these amendments.118 Judge Fairchild therefore felt that the weight to be given the
admonition was a matter between Congress and the Board, and that if
Congress felt that the Board was not heeding the admonition, the proper
remedy would be a further change in the statute itself." 9 Concluding his
dissent, Judge Fairchild expressed the belief that even though his was a
"purist approach," he felt it was an appropriate one. 20
The Board's Most Recent Response to Mounting
Criticism:St. FrancisHospital
121
On December 16, 1982, the Board decided St. Francis Hospital,
wherein thirty-nine maintenance employees sought separate representation from the other approximately 400 employees in the combined maintenance and service departments. 2 2 St. Francis was a 529-bed hospital in
23
Memphis, Tennessee with approximately 1,300 total employees.
The Regional Director had relied upon the Board's decision in
Allegheny General Hospital 24 in finding that the maintenance
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

621F.2dat864.
Id at 861 (citing Shriner's Hosp., 217 N.L.R.B. 806, 89 L.R.R.M. 1076 (1975)).
621 F.2d at 861-62.
Id. at 862-63.
Id at 864.
Id (Fairchild, J., dissenting).

117. Id (Fairchild, J., dissenting).
118. Id (Fairchild, J., dissenting).
119. Id (Fairchild, J., dissenting).
120. Id (Fairchild, J., dissenting).
121. 265 N.L.R.B. No. 120, 112 L.R.R.M. 1153 (1982).
122. Id, No. 120, slip op. at 3.
123. Id, No. 120, slip op. at 2..
124. 239 N.L.R.B. 872, 100 L.R.R.M. 1030 (1978), enforcement denied, 608 F.2d 965 (3rd Cir.
1979). See also supranotes 82-96 and accompanying text.
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employees involved were entitled to separate representation.12 5 The Board
noted that in Allegheny Generalenforcement of its order had been denied
by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit based on what that court
believed to be a failure by the Board to heed the congressional admonition against undue unit proliferation in health care facilities. 126 In St.
Francis,the Board accepted the Third Circuit's criticisms of its Allegheny
General decision as justified. 127 However, it expressed the view that the
fault with the Board decision in Allegheny Generallay not with failure to
heed the admonition, but rather with a failure to explain precisely the
approach being used by the Board in health care unit determination
cases. 128

The Board focused upon the language and the history of the 1974
Amendments. 129 It noted that Congress had chosen not to limit health
care units to four predetermined possibilities as Senator Taft had proposed, but rather had chosen to leave health care unit determinations to
the expertise of the Board, which was to consider the congressional
130
admonition in making its deicison.
After examining a number of decisions which the Board believed
demonstrated that it was not using in health care settings merely the
same traditional standards used in industrial settings,13' the majority opinion next outlined the approach contemplated to give due consideration to
the congressional admonition against undue unit proliferation in health

care facilities.

125. 265 N.L.R.B. No. 120, slip op. at 4, 112 L.R.R.M. 1153 at 1154.
126. Id., No. 120, slip op. at 5-6, 112 L.R.R.M. at 1154.
127. Id., No. 120, slip op. at 6, 112 L.R.R.M. at 1155.
128. Id, No. 120, slip op. at 5-6, 112 L.R.R.M. at 1155.
129. Id., No. 120, slip op. at 7-11, 112 L.R.R.M. at 1155-56.
130. Id.
131. Id. The majority first pointed to St. Catherine's Hosp., 217 N.L.R.B. 787, 89 L.R.R.M.
1070 (1975), wherein a group of licensed practical nurses sought separate representation. Id. They
relied upon Madeira Nursing Center, 203 N.L.R.B. 323,83 L.R.R.M. 1033 (1973), which was decided
18 months prior to passage of the amendments of 1974, and which relied upon traditional practice in
finding a separate unit of licensed practical nurses appropriate. Id. The Board in St. Catherine's
nonetheless rejected the request for separate representation of the LPNs thus overruling Madeira.265
N.L.R.B. No. 120, slip. op. at II, 112 L.R.R.M. 1153 at 1156. The Board in St. Francis next
cited Kaiser Found. Hosps., 219 N.L.R.B. 325, 89 L.R.R.M. 1763 (1975), which was the first postamendment consideration of the appropriateness of separate units for pharmacists in health-care
facilities. Id. while noting that many of the traditional industrial factors counseling for separate
representation were present, the Board denied the request for separate representation as inconsistent
with the congressional intent in the legislative history of the 1974 Amendments to the Act. Id. The
Board in St. Francisalso cited Levine Hosp. of Hayward, Inc., 219 N.L.R.B. 327,90 L.R.R.M. 1097
(1975) (residual employees were denied separate representational status) and Duke Univ., 217
N.L.R.B. 799, 89 L.R.R.M. 1065 (1975) (switchboard operators denied separate unit based upon
legislative history of the 1974 amendments) as evidence that they were using standards in health-care
unit determinations different from those used in traditional settings. 265 N.L.R.B. No. 120, slip op. at
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The Board's approach involved a two-tier analysis wherein the first
level identified certain groups of employees commonly found in health
care facilities. 32 The seven such groups were: physicians, registered
nurses, other professional employees, technical employees, business office
clerical employees, service and maintenance employees and skilled maintenance employees. 133 Under the Board's approach, if the employee group
seeking separate representational status falls into one of the seven listed
categories, the Board will proceed to the second level of analysis which
involves application of the traditional "community of interests" standards
to determine if the group constitutes an appropriate unit. 34 If the group
does not fall into one of the listed categories, the Board will proceed no
further and will dismiss the petition for separate representational status
unless "extraordinary and compelling" facts are presented to the Board
which justify the allowance of a smaller unit. 135 The Board majority

believed that in setting up this screening system, which in its eyes restricts
the number of potentially appropriate units more so than does the unal-

tered application of the traditional "community of interests" approach,
it had met its statutory duty to protect against proliferation of units in
136

health-care facilities.
The Board majority next focused upon the "disparity of interest"
analysis called for by the two dissenting opinions 37 as well as by two
recent courts of appeals decisions. 38 The majority stated its belief that the
logical extension of the "disparity of interests" test would lead to finding
the largest unit allowable consistent with the Act, and would limit the
number of possible health care units to two: professionals and nonprofessionals. 39 The Board opinion stated that this result would be
entirely inconsistent with long established congressional views on unit
12-14, 112 L.R.R.M. 1153 at 1157.
132. 265 N.L.R.B. No. 120, slip op. at 15, 112 L.R.R.M. at 1157.
133. Id
134. Id., No. 120, slip op. at 15-16, 112 L.R.R.M. at 1157-58..
135. Id, No. 120, slip op. at 16, 112 L.R.R.M. at 1158.
136. Id.
137. Id., No. 120, slip op. at 16-18, 112 L.R.R.M. at 1158-59. Resolving the problem through
use of the "disparity of interests" approach means that instead of looking at what employees have in
common and granting separate representation if sufficient evidence is found (as in the approach of the
"community of interests" approach), the inquiry begins by asking what factors are different concerning the employees' work atmosphere. The presumption, under "disparity of interests," is against
separate representational status, and only upon a showing by the employees that denying them
separate representation will deny their organizational rights guaranteed by the Act will separate
representation be granted. While the starting point for resolution of a unit determination problem is
different under the "disparity of interests" test, it does not necessarily mean a unit seeking separate
status is facing an insurmountable burden. It will simply place a heavier burden upon that unit than
the unit would face under the traditional community of interests test used in industrial settings.
138. See Presbyterian/St. Lukes Medical Centerv. NLRB, 653 F.2d 450 (10th Cir. 1981), Beth
Israel Hosp. and Geriatric Center v. NLRB, 677 F.2d 1343 (10th Cir. 1981).
139. 265 N.L.R.B. No. 120, slip op. at 21, 112 L.R.R.M. at 1159.
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determination. 40 Had Congress intended such a radical change, the opinion continued, it would have made it in the statute itself rather than in an
141
admonition contained in the legislative history.
After restating what it believed to be the proper approach to health
care unit determination cases and its view that the "disparity of interests"
analysis was one factor, albeit not dispositive, in the "community of
142
interests" standard, the majority turned to the facts of St. Francisitself.
The Board focused upon many of the traditional "community of interests" criteria-levels of skill, separate supervision, special training requirements, segregation from other employees, and differences in pay scaleand held that the thirty-nine maintenance employees were entitled to
143
separate representation.
In a lengthy dissent, Chairman Van De Water quarrelled with the
majority approach on three major grounds. 144 He asserted: (1) that the
majority view ignores and is inconsistent with the congressional mandate
calling for limitation of unit proliferation in health-care facilities, (2) that
the majority's view ignores and contravenes the interpretation of that
congressional mandate by the courts of appeals; and, (3) that the Board
majority's position in St. Francisis inconsistent with its former position
145
on the issue while purporting to continue to use the same approach.
In his analysis, Van De Water used language of former Board decisions to demonstrate that the Board has not been, as was contended by
the St. Francismajority, using an approach different in health care cases
than that used in more common industrial cases. 146 Again using prior
Board decisional langauge, Van De Water pointed out that the Board has
(incorrectly, in his view) been interpreting the congressional admonition
as a mandate to avoid the excessive unit proliferation allowable in the
construction industry, but not as requiring standards in health care cases
which are more strict than those applied in other non-construction industrial cases. 147 Van De Water's dissent next proceeded through a circuit-bycircuit analysis of courts of appeals cases wherein this interpretation of the
admonition was unequivocally rejected, and a standard was applied in

140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id., No. 120, slip op. at 28, 112 L.R.R.M. at 1161. The majority view ignores the unique
and unprecedented fact that the legislative history of the health care amendments, i.e. the House and
Senate Committee Reports, are identical. These Committee Reports were the product of careful and
prolonged negotiations among the health care industry, union representatives and the members of
Congress.
143. Id., No. 120, slip op. at 28-33, 112 L.R.R.M. at 1161-62.
144. Id. (Chairman Van De Water, dissenting).

145. Iad
146. Id.
147. Id.
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health care unit determination cases which is more strict than the usual
industrial standard. 148
Van De Water concluded his dissent by calling for a "disparity of
interests" analysis in health care unit determination cases rather than the
traditional "community of interests" standard.1 49 He felt that only
through this approach, which had been suggested by two of the courts of
appeals decisions discussed in his dissent, could the Board give due consideration to the congressional admonition against unit proliferation in
health care. 150 The "disparity of interests" approach would allow units
more limited than. all professional and all non-professional employees
only upon a showing that the unit sought enjoys a "notable disparity of
interests from employees in the larger unit which would prohibit or
inhibit fair- representation for them if they were denied separate
151
representation."
Member Hunter also dissented and called for application of "disparity of interests" analysis in health-care unit determination cases. 152 Hunter
accused the Board majority of "don[ning] sackcloth [and] pay[ing] verbal
homage to the circuits [while] undertak[ing] a flawed analysis of legislative history and precedent, all in an effort to breathe new life into its
approach to unit determination in this unique industry." 53 He further
stated that what the Board majority purports to be a "new" analytical
approach is little more than "a rehash of the same old analysis that has
been rejected by every circuit that has considered the issue."' 154 Many of
the criticisms of the majority opinion found in Member Hunter's dissent
mirror those of Chairman Van De Water 55 as well as those of the various
courts of appeals decisions which have addressed the issue of health care
unit determination in light of the congressional admonition against unit
56
proliferation.
ANALYSIS

The dispute between the Board and the courts of appeals on the issue
of health care unit determinations can be broken down into two separate
parts: (1) there is a sharp and basic disagreement concerning the weight to
be afforded the congressional admonition against undue unit proliferation in health care facilities as expressed in the legislative history to the
148.
149.
150.

Id.
Id.
Id.

151.

Id.

152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. (Member Hunter, dissenting).
Id.
Id
See supra notes 134-41 and accompanying text.

156.

See supranote 75 and accompanying text.
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1974 Amendments to the Act; (2) the Board and the courts of appeals
sharply differ over the degree to which the Board is bound to follow
57
courts of appeals' decisions on issues of statutory construction.1
The Board majority believes that it retains discretion to decide unit
determinations, notwithstanding contrary statutory interpretation by a
court of appeals, and also feels that since Senator Taft's proposal limiting
to four the number of possible appropriate units in health care unit
determinations met with defeat, the Board maintains the same unit
determination discretion in health care as in other areas subject only to
the mandate of considering the congressional admonition in reaching its
decision. 158 The courts of appeals, on the other hand, believe that the
Board has failed to give due weight to the admonition, and on the stare
decisis issue, the Third Circuit recently stated:
[i]t is in this court by virtue of its responsibility as the statutory court
of review ... that Congress has vested a superior power for the
interpretation of the congressional mandate. Congress has not given
to the NLRB the power or authority-to disagree, respectfully or other159
Wise, with decisions of this court.
The reasoning quoted above from the Third Circuit's opinion in
Allegheny Hospitalseems appealing, especially in light of the hierarchical system of judicial review of Board determinations. 60 The courts of
appeals lie betWeen the Board and the Supreme Court in that system.
Thus, it would seem logical that the Board would be bound by courts of
appeals dcisi'on in the same way that the Board and the courts of
appeals are bound by Supreme Court decisions. However, it would be
erroneous to accept the view of the Third Circuit-that the Board is bound
to follov !he courts of appeals-without further inquiry, both because
thai proposition is by no means the only acceptable argument on the issue
and because acceptance of such a view would leave a number of unanswered questions.
When the Supreme Court resolves an issue of national labor law it
speaks in language which binds the entire nation. The views of the
Supreme Court override any contrary views held by different courts of
appeals or by the Board and become the law of the land. Such is not the
case when a court of appeals renders an opinion on a particular issue of
labor law. There are now thirteen circuits, and to take the language
expressed by the court in Allegheny Hospitalto its logical extreme would
157. See supra notes 29-37 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
159. 608 F.2d at 970 (citing Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. FMC, 390 U.S. 261 (1968)).
The court also relied upon the landmark case for judicial review, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137 (1803).
160. See supra notes 29-37 and accompanying text.
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mean that the first court of appeals to decide an issue would write binding
law for the entire nation, which the Board would be bound to follow until
another court of appeals reached a different conclusion, or until the
Supreme Court decided the issue.
Moreover, the views expressed in Allegheny Hospitalfail to give any
guidance on how the Board would be forced to act in the very common
situation where there is disagreement among two or more courts of
appeals on a particular issue. It would not be acceptable merely to have
the Board follow the views of the then-majority of courts of appeals, for
to do so would very likely force the Board to switch sides a number of
times before all of the courts of appeals have spoken.
Another possible alternative would be for the Board to follow the
courts of appeals in those circuits which have spoken on an issue and to
follow its own contrary views where a court of appeals has yet to confront
the issue. Aside from the lack of uniformity that would result from such
an approach, the Board's views on the stare decisis value of courts of
appeals decisions make this alternative a highly unlikely one.
While there may be situations where, because of a conflict between
circuits or the fact that only a limited number of circuits have confronted
an issue, the Board may justifiably maintain a position contrary to that of
a court of appeals. The health care unit determination issue, however,
does not present such a situation.
As previously addressed herein, the appropriate standard for health
care unit determinations has been considered on many occasions by the
various courts of appeals.1 6' There is no conflict among those decisions.
In every court of appeals decision to confront the issue, the Board's failure
to properly heed the congressional admonition against unit proliferation
in the health care industry has been held improper. 62 Because the courts
of appeals have unanimously rejected the Board's stance on the health
care unit determination issue and because decisions of the courts of
appeals bind the Board on questions of statuto:y construction, the Board
is thus duty-bound to take a more restrictive approach than the traditional "community of interests" test which it has used in such cases.
Even aside from the impropriety of the Board's position as a matter
of its*obligatory duty to accept statutory construction decided by the
Supreme Court and the courts of appeals, the Board's position is flawed.
The legislative history of the 1974 Amendments unequivocally calls for a
more restrictive approach to health-care unit determinations. 163 Yet,
under the Board's approach, an employer in an average sized hospital

161.
162.
163.

See supra notes 63-110 and accompanying text.
Id
See supranotes 29-38 and accompanying text.
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would be forced to bargain with as many as seven different units 64
whereas that employer's industrial counterpart would usually have to
bargain with only two: production/ maintenance and office/ clerical. This
comparison demonstrates the fact that the Board's position fails to afford
the health care employer with the protection against unit proliferation
which was incorporated in the 1974 Amendments to the Act. Only by
incorporating such protections was a compromise possible in Congress,
enabling passage of those Amendments.165
That Congress chose to treat the health care industry differently than
other industries is likewise not subject to dispute. The special strike-notice
provisions, the provision for FMCS fact finding and the special notice
provisions regarding termination or expiration of a contract 166 demonstrate a treatment of the health care industry which treatment is unique to
that industry alone in the almost 50 years of operating under the Act.
More specifically, in the congressional admonition against unit proliferation in health care, both the Senate and the House committees
"noted with approval" three Board decisions focusing upon health-care
unit issues. 167 These decisions were carefully selected and in all three of the
cited decisions, separate representational status was denied to groups of
health care employees seeking their own unit. 168 Thus, aside from the
language of the admonition itself, the cases cited were to be used as
guidelines in constructing the Amendments, calling upon the Board to use
an approach in health care more restrictive than that used in other industries. 169 This the Board has unjustifiably refused to do. "
The Board's contention in St. Francis that it is applying a more
restrictive test in health care settings through its so-called screening process is both transparent and unacceptable. Examination of the relevant
cases reveals that the Board's purportedly "new" approach described in
St. Francisis nothing more than a reiteration, using different language, of
its seven unit Mercy Hospitalsof Sacramento approach. 70 That approach
was justifiably rejected by the courts of appeals and will no doubt be
rejected again should the Board continue to adhere to it. The time has
come for the Board to stop rationalizing and changing the wrappings of
an approach which is erroneous and which has been shown to be so by
the courts of appeals, and to follow that approach mandated by those
courts.
The simplest and surest method of deciding with finality exactly
what Congress called for in the 1974 Amendments to the Act would be
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
See supranote 37 and accompanying text.
Id.
Id
217 N.L.R.B. 765, 89 L.R.R.M. 1097 (1975).
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for the Supreme Court to hear a case involving an issue of unit determination in a health care facility. However, the law in this area is sufficiently
developed that Supreme Court determination should not be necessary.
The law regarding health care unit determinations has become clear, both

from the congressional intent itself as expressed in the legislative history
behind the 1974 Amendments to the Act and from the decisions of the
courts of appeals which have interpreted that statutory language: a more
restrictive approach for determining appropriate units is required in
health care than in other industries. The Board's continuing and unjustified position to the contrary, if unaltered, will harm the system of resolving labor disputes and encourage unnecessary litigation by health care
employers seeking to obtain their rights which were granted by Congress
in the 1974 Amendments to the Act.
CONCLUSION

While legislative amendment or Supreme Court decision of the issue
of health care unit determinations would resolve the sharp conflict which
has existed between the Board and the courts of appeals, the Board
should alleviate the need for such action by accepting the fact that the
approach it has been following is erroneous and indefensible. The Board's
position is erroneous in two respects: (1) it fails to heed the congressional
admonition against health-care unit proliferation which was essential in
the compromise which led to passage of the 1974 Amendments to the
Act; and, (2) it contravenes the duty of the Board to accept the uniform
views of the courts of appeals on an issue of statutory construction. The
precious resources of Congress and the Supreme Court should not have
to be called upon to decide an issue which should have been finally
resolved long ago.*
*Editors'Note: After this article had been completed and set in print for publication, the Board or
August 13, 1984 reconsidered its still recent St. Francis decision and, as urged herein, adopted a
more restrictive approach to health-care determination cases. St. Francis Hosp., 271 N.L.R.B. No.
160, 116 L.R.R.M. 1471 (1984) (St. Francis II). The Board's new approach represents "a clear
rejection of Board precedent to-this point since the 1974 health-care amendments." 271 N.L.R.B.
slip op. at 19, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1471. While the courts of appeals decisions discussed in this article
had been unanimous in rejecting the Board's traditional aproach to health-care unit determination
cases, there was disagreement regarding whether a strict "disparity of interests" test should be
adopted or whether the Board would be called upon to balance the traditional "community of
interests" factors against the congressional admonition, which the courts of appeals felt was not
being given sufficient heed by the Board. Compare NLRB v. St. Francis Hosp. of Lynwood, 601
E2d 404 (9th Cir. 1979) ("disparity of interests" test adopted) with Trustees of the Masonic Hall v.
NLRB, 699 F.2d 626 (2nd Cir. 1983) (balancing test adopted). The Board in St. Francis II chose to
adopt a "disparity of interests" test but cautioned that it would not be the rigid disparity of interests
test urged by some courts of appeals. 271 N.L.R.B. slip op. at 16, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1471. The Board
chose to leave to future cases the definition and parameters of its new "disparity of interests" test.
Because the issue of health-care unit determination constitutes the single issue with the largest
number of cases presently pending before the Board, and because the Board's new test will be
evolving over the next several years as the Board decides those cases, the analysis contained in this
article continues to be relevant and to provide guidance on the issue of health-care unit
determination.
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